Hezbollah and Hugo Chavez: Radical Islam's Western Foothold by Pickell, Samuel Vernon
  
 
 
 
 
Hezbollah and Hugo Chavez: 
Radical Islam’s Western Foothold 
 
 
 
By 
 
 
Samuel Pickell 
The University of Kansas, 2010 
 
 
Submitted to the Department of Global and  
International Studies and the Faculty of the  
Graduate School of the University of Kansas in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts. 
 
     
 
______________________________ 
 
        Dr. Rose L. Greaves 
       Chairperson 
 
  ______________________________ 
        
       Dr. Robert Baumann 
 
 
______________________________ 
 
       Dr. Hal Wert  
 
 
 
 
Date Defended::________________ 
 ii 
 
 
 
The Thesis Committee for Samuel Pickell certifies  
that this is the approved Version of the following thesis: 
 
 
 
 
 
Hezbollah and Hugo Chavez: 
Radical Islam’s Western Foothold 
 
 
 
 
 
Committee: 
 
 
 
 
______________________________ 
 
        Dr. Rose L. Greaves 
       Chairperson 
 
  ______________________________ 
        
       Dr. Robert Baumann 
 
 
______________________________ 
 
       Dr. Hal Wert  
 
 
 
 
Date approved:_________________ 
 
 
 
 iii 
Abstract: 
 
  
 
In recent years reports have appeared in government publications and the media 
alleging that the close relationship between Iran and Venezuela has resulted in the 
flourishing of radical Islamic groups like Hezbollah within Venezuela. This paper seeks 
to examine the juncture between Iran, Hezbollah, and Venezuela under Hugo Chavez. 
Chavez’ socialist project underway in Venezuela shares many fundamental ideological 
principles with revolutionary Iran, most notably in its rejection of the current Western-led 
geopolitical order. This marriage of convenience has allowed both states to cement their 
respective positions as leaders of the global anti-American movement and has provided a 
platform from which Hezbollah and its Iranian patron have extended their global 
outreach. This paper seeks to examine this mutually-beneficial arrangement, and attempts 
to explain the risks and threats presented by this scenario for Latin America, Iran, and the 
United States.  
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Introduction 
Hugo Chavez’ strategy of embracing Iran in its quest to build an “anti-imperialist” 
and anti-American coalition of nations has undoubtedly gained strength in recent years.  
Beyond the close ties between Venezuela and Iran due to the two countries’ shared anti-
American priorities, there are also many similarities between the basic ideologies of 
Chavez’ Bolivarian revolution and Iranian revolutionary thought.  The Lebanese group 
Hezbollah shares many of Iran’s priorities and principles, and it receives a sizeable 
amount of financial support from the Islamic Republic.   
Although its armed activities are focused primarily within its traditional area of 
operations in the Middle East, Hezbollah has been implicated in terrorist activities around 
the globe. These activities range from financing and training to outright attacks and 
cooperation with criminal elements.  The recent establishment of direct airline flights 
between Caracas and Tehran, as well as the eagerness of both regimes to embrace the 
other, does not bode well for anti-terror prospects in Latin America, given the close 
collaboration of Iranian and Hezbollah operatives in the past. Hezbollah members and 
sympathizers have gained the ability to move with relative ease outside the Middle East 
to Latin America and such movements already appear to be taking place. This points to a 
particularly worrisome possibility: that Hezbollah will move beyond financing and 
support in Latin America to pursue operational objectives within the Western 
Hemisphere.  
Hugo Chavez has established himself as a left-leaning opponent of the United 
States and its allies in Latin America.  Chavez openly praises the actions of rebel groups 
in US-allied Colombia like the FARC, which the US and other nations have designated as 
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terrorist organizations. These groups have a demonstrated track record of violence and 
drug smuggling.  Chavez’ readiness to support these groups based on a shared anti-
American sentiment should come as no surprise to those who view Chavez’ moves as 
calculated to ruffle feathers in Washington and Bogotá.  However, given the recent 
strategic alignment of Iran and Venezuela, this also serves as evidence of his willingness 
to support far more unsavory organizations like Hezbollah. 
 This paper seeks to understand the influence of Hezbollah within Latin America, 
particularly in the states of Venezuela and Colombia, as well as Iran’s role in Venezuela 
and the surrounding region.  Evidence demonstrates that that there exists in Latin 
America at least a small level of support for radical Islam and in particular groups like 
Hezbollah, though precisely what impact this support has upon these groups’ ability to 
covertly function within society remains unclear.  This is evidenced by the emergence of 
small, local, Hezbollah-inspired radical Islamic groups in Latin America, most notably 
“Hezbollah Venezuela.”  Though lacking logistical support and large bases such as those 
which exist in Lebanon and Iran, these groups share similar ideological views with the 
“Bolivarian revolutionary” ideology of Hugo Chavez.  They share Chavez’ emphasis on 
resistance to neo-liberalism and capitalism. They also share his staunch anti-American 
platform, and openly praise his efforts on jihadist websites and communiqués.  
 Thus far, the threat that Hezbollah has posed in the Latin American region has 
come in the form of obtaining material support, rather than seeking to carry out 
operations in the region, with two notable exceptions to be discussed further.  Evidence 
indicates that as Iran’s engagement in Venezuela has increased so too has that of 
Hezbollah.  The potential support available from the large Lebanese expatriate 
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community in the region and the copycat organizations in Latin America that Hezbollah 
has already spawned demonstrate the potential of Hezbollah’s ideological inspiration to 
indoctrinate other radical Islamist groups within Latin America.  This inspirational 
prospect is heightened by what evidence suggests is a certain level of cooperation on the 
part of Chavez’ government.  
Chavez’ revolutionary project in Venezuela is predicated upon a radical 
restructuring of the Venezuelan economy and society. His intention is to use the 
country’s oil revenues to reduce the dramatic wealth disparity present in Venezuelan 
society. Internationally, Chavez’ presidency has thus far been dominated by harsh anti-
American rhetoric and attempts to create a multi-polar coalition of states opposed to the 
current geopolitical order. However, his political survival is dependent on his ability to 
deliver for his population those things that previous governments have been unable or 
unwilling to do. This primarily includes the delivery of basic services and an increase in 
social justice and equality. Chavez’ ability to achieve these domestic goals is put at risk 
primarily by his proclivities to align Venezuela with states like Iran, and by proxy, with 
dangerous organizations like Hezbollah. 
By making Venezuela an attractive and accessible place for these groups to 
operate, Chavez is creating a problem for his own government, the region, and ultimately 
the United States and the rest of the western world. Despite his anti-American rhetoric 
about US attempts to dominate Latin America and the world, Chavez is slowly but surely 
aligning himself with organizations and states that, if history is any indicator, may well 
prove more far more hazardous to the security of Venezuela than he imagines the United 
States could ever be.  
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Historical Foundations of Hezbollah and Iran 
Lebanese Demographics and Civil War 
 Lebanon’s fifteen-year war has been described as “at once a civil, communal war 
between Muslims and Christians, a Palestinian-Lebanese War, and a proxy Arab-Israeli 
war.”1  It can perhaps also be seen as a series of circumstances and events which 
continually added fuel to an already burning fire, entrenching the warring parties and 
hardening their positions.  The causes that started the fighting in 1975 are numerous, but 
the central foundation for discontent and factionalism that led to open conflict can be 
traced to the demographics of Lebanon, and their distinctive role in its government. 
Lebanon’s unique power structure, which had been in place since independence from 
France in 1943, was a reflection of the heterogeneous population that made up the small 
country of around one million people at its founding. Upon independence, the Lebanese 
had agreed on an unwritten set of principles upon which their government would be 
founded, known as the National Pact.  
The most important aspect of the National Pact was its codification of the division 
of government, giving each religious sect a specific role to play. The president was to be 
a Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni, and the Speaker of the Parliament a Shiite.2  It 
also assigned religious quotas to the unicameral parliament, giving Christians a majority 
by a 6:5 ratio. This was based upon the only census ever conducted in Lebanon, by the 
French in 1932, which indicated that Christians made up roughly 51% of the population 
compared to 42% who were Muslim, and 7% Druze.3  This arrangement worked well for 
several decades, and Lebanon enjoyed a long period of relative peace and prosperity, and 
                                                 
1 Ajami, Fouad. The Dream Palace of the Arabs. 1998. p.87. 
2 Hittie, Phillip. A Short History of Lebanon. p.225 
3 “Lebanon Civil War 1975-1991. Globalsecurity.org  
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a large influx of western investment. Beirut during the 1950s and 60s was known as the 
“Paris of the Middle East,” with its cosmopolitan environment and picturesque beachside 
resorts catering to tourists from around the world.4 So successful did it appear that many 
political scientists in the US at the time hailed Lebanon as a “model of proper 
modernization, leading to political moderation, secularization and stability.”5  
This analysis would prove to be overly optimistic because by 1970, despite the 
lack of a new census, it was apparent to all that the ratio of the population had drastically 
reversed, with Muslims now making up a solid majority. This has been attributed to both 
the emigration of Lebanese Christians, as well as high birthrates among the poorer 
Muslim population.6 However, political realities had not been altered to reflect this 
development, leading to frustration and resentment among Muslim sections of the 
population who felt they were underrepresented.  
The Christians, who stood to lose control of Parliament as well as the presidency 
and control of the armed forces, resisted this movement, and refused to entertain 
discussions on altering the National Pact. As part of this resistance, a large Christian 
party known as the Phalange soon had its own armed militia of nearly 10,000 men, a 
development not lost on other sects who quickly followed suit. Within a very short time, 
nearly every sect had its own militia created to protect its respective members, tearing 
apart the heterogeneous nature of traditional Lebanese society and establishing conditions 
ripe for sectarian conflict. Lebanon had become a powder keg, requiring only a small 
spark to set it alight.   
                                                 
4 Karsh, Efraim. Islamic Imperialism: A History. p.226 
5 Lockman, Zachary. Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History of Politics and Orientalism.      
   p.172 
6 “Lebanon Civil War 1975-1991. Globalsecurity.org 
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7 Globalsecurity.org. Accessed 11-15-09. 
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Foreign Influence in Lebanese Politics 
A recurring theme in the history of Lebanon has been the often negative role of 
foreign influence in Lebanese internal affairs. Long ruled by the Ottoman Empire, 
Lebanon has consistently served as a crossroads between East and West, maintaining 
strong ties to the Western world despite its location in the Middle East. This Western 
orientation has allowed it to serve as a hub of commerce and the Lebanese have long 
been known as shrewd capitalists and entrepreneurs in a region typically dominated by 
stagnant economic conditions. Under the Ottomans, the Lebanese enjoyed a long period 
of relative peace and prosperity.  
Given Lebanon’s strategic location, it is no surprise that foreign powers have 
sought to assert influence over Lebanese affairs for centuries. Unfortunately for Lebanon, 
most of these attempts have had little to do with the well-being of the Lebanese people, 
and have generally been downright hostile to Lebanese interests. Following World War I 
and the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, Lebanon was governed by the French under a 
League of Nations mandate until independence in 1943. The transition to independence 
would prove to be dominated by the competing interests of foreign powers including the 
French and British, for whom war objectives remained a priority over Lebanese 
aspirations for self-rule. 8 
Early into Lebanese independence, other regional actors would attempt to assert 
influence. Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser would unite with Syria to form the short-lived 
United Arab Republic from 1958 to 1961. 9 Lebanon’s main political factions were 
                                                 
8 Thompson, Soumaya Zeine.  Anglo-Free French Relations in the Levant, 1941-1945. Dissertation, 
University of Kansas, 1990.  p. 7.  
9 Aburish, Said K. .asser, the Last Arab, New York: St. Martin's Press, 2004. p. 164.  
 
   
 8 
divided over whether to support or oppose Nasser’s pan-Arab movement, resulting in the 
1958 Civil War that would force the intervention of US and British forces to prop up the 
Christian-led pro-Western government, successfully ending the crisis.10  
Though this crisis was averted and would allow for Lebanon to maintain its status 
as a cosmopolitan conglomeration of East and West, it highlighted the undercurrent of 
tension between Lebanon’s Western-leaning Christians and the increasingly vocal Arab-
oriented Muslim population that would resurface violently in the early 1970’s. The 
outbreak of this second Civil War would again provide ample opportunity for foreign 
powers to pursue their own agendas in the context of Lebanon’s complex demographic 
and political scene. In nearly all instances, opposing factions were backed by larger 
geopolitical rivals, serving to further enhance the polarizing split within Lebanese 
society.  
The most prominent of these were the Syrians, who first inserted themselves into 
Lebanon under the pretext of a peacekeeping force and became the dominant power 
broker until 2005 when they would be forced to withdraw following Lebanese 
opposition. Though the Syrians were the most visible, other regional neighbors would 
find ample opportunity to move into Lebanon. The Palestinians, who moved into 
southern Lebanon after being expelled from Jordan in 1970, would prove to be a major 
cause of conflict as well.11 They operated against Israel out of refugee camps in southern 
Lebanon, prompting Israeli retaliations that directly impacted Lebanese. This prompted 
some of the first militia groups to take action against the Palestinians, who were seen to 
                                                 
10 Foreign Relations of the United States, Oct. 17, 1957. Vol. 13, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Document 143. 
Accessed online 4-6-2010. 
11 Foreign Relations of the United States, Sept. 28, 1970. Vol. 24. Near East: Jordan, Document 330. 
Accessed online 4-7-2010. 
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be taking advantage of Lebanese hospitality only to be repaid in the form of Israeli 
reprisal attacks.  
This pattern of foreign actors negatively influencing Lebanese affairs continues to 
the present day. The chain of events sparked by the Lebanese Civil War drew the interest 
and intervention of major powers like the US, and also of regional states like Israel, 
Syria, and Iran. While it is difficult to imagine how Lebanon might have evolved if left to 
its own devices, what is clear is that continual foreign intervention in the Lebanese 
political scene has provided a context for conflict, sectarian division, and internal strife.  
None of these foreign actors had, as a core priority, the interests of the Lebanese people. 
External meddling remains an indelible part of Lebanon’s political and social fabric, and 
as will be seen, it continues to foment crises and foster internal division today.  
 
Formation of Hezbollah  
 By the start of the Lebanese Civil War, it was clear that Shiites had come to make 
up a substantial proportion of Lebanese society. Though many of the other militia 
factions had formed in response to a feeling of being threatened as a sect, Hezbollah, or 
the “Party of God,” is a Shiite movement that came about relatively late in the conflict in 
1982 as a reaction to Israeli incursions into southern Lebanon. It was begun by a small 
cadre of young, dedicated and religious revolutionaries who took direct inspiration from 
the then-recent 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran. Indeed, the founding document of 
Hezbollah, published openly in 1985, emphasized the Iranian example as a model of what 
could be achieved when Muslims are committed and united under the banner of Islam.   
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Hezbollah identified strongly with Ayatollah Khomeini’s worldview, and stressed 
that successful resistance to oppression can only be achieved by fighting the real enemy, 
which it described when stating: “Imam Khomeini, the leader, has repeatedly stressed 
that America is the reason for all our catastrophes and the source of all malice. By 
fighting it, we are only exercising our legitimate right to defend our Islam and the dignity 
of our nation.”12  Indeed, throughout Hezbollah strongholds in southern Lebanon and 
south Beirut it is not uncommon to see large banners of Khomeini displayed prominently.  
 At the end of the war, Hezbollah was the only signatory to the Taif Accords 
ending the fighting that did not relinquish its weapons as called for in the agreement. It 
made this claim on the basis that Israel was still occupying southern Lebanon as a buffer 
zone against incursions on its northern border.  Hezbollah declared it would remain 
armed as a resistance force guarding Lebanese sovereignty against Israeli occupation, a 
position which received considerable support among many of the previously warring 
factions.  Indeed, since the end of the war, Hezbollah has remained the preeminent armed 
force in Lebanon, surpassing the Lebanese military in many respects. In disagreements 
with the Lebanese government, it has at times engaged the military in street battles, and it 
regularly mounts cross-border attacks into Israel from its south Lebanon stronghold.  
The patronage of Iran has allowed Hezbollah to maintain its viability as a credible 
fighting force, supplying training and financing, as well as a wide variety of weaponry. 
At the same time, the political wing of Hezbollah has continued to gain support among 
Lebanese Shiites through food banks, direct payouts, job placement, medical clinics, and 
other social outreach programs. These programs are not restricted to Shiites only, 
                                                 
12 Norton, Richard. Hezbollah. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. Print. p37. 
   
 11 
however, and have indeed managed to cultivate patrons among all sections of Lebanese 
society and gain support for Hezbollah as a political faction. Accordingly, Hezbollah has 
a number of seats in the Lebanese parliament, and in 2008 elections it narrowly lost a 
parliamentary majority to a US-allied coalition of parties, surprising many analysts who 
had expected the Party of God to win.13   
It is tempting to equate the status of Hezbollah in Lebanon to the circumstances in 
Northern Ireland in which the Irish Republican Army remained armed and continued 
attacks against British and Protestant targets, while its political wing, Sinn Fein, garnered 
legitimacy and a seat at the negotiating table.  Though many similarities exist between 
the two situations, the significant difference is that, as evidenced by its founding 
document and the patronage of a foreign power, Hezbollah’s aims do not focus solely on 
Lebanese internal politics alone.  Indeed, despite Israel’s 2000 withdrawal from South 
Lebanon and its significance as eliminating the raison d'être of Hezbollah’s armed wing, 
the group has taken no steps towards disarmament, nor announced any plans to do so.   
Far from it, Hezbollah has only increased its armed presence and activities since 
the Israeli withdrawal, continuing to mount attacks against Israeli forces and carry out 
kidnapping operations against soldiers. Illustrating this point quite clearly is the 2006 
Summer War in which Hezbollah forces held off the far-superior Israeli military for 
several weeks. The conflict highlighted enhanced capabilities, with long-range rocket 
strikes into Israeli coastal towns and at times sending unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) 
on reconnaissance missions; a capability thought until then to be solely within the 
                                                 
13 Whittington, Mark. “2009 Lebanon Election Result a Hezbollah Defeat.” Associated Content. 8 Jun. 
2009. 
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purview of advanced militaries.14 Such capabilities are clear indicators of an intricate 
support network with funding and technology transfers on a significant scale.  
 
Organizational Structure of Hezbollah 
 Hezbollah has evolved over the course of its existence from a ragtag band of 
dedicated activists into a highly organized bureaucratic structure. What started as purely a 
resistance organization against Israeli incursions during the Lebanese Civil War 
eventually became a group with complex and structured divisions of responsibility, with 
the Secretary General as its head. The current and longest-serving Secretary General is 
Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, who in the early 1980’s was a prominent young activist in the 
Shiite AMAL organization, founded by the well-known Shiite cleric Musa Sadr. AMAL, 
which means “hope” in Arabic and is an acronym for The Lebanese Resistance 
Detachments, was formed in 1975 to promote Shiite representation and rights in 
Lebanese politics. It remained relatively secular in its agenda, and Sadr even worked 
closely with members of the Greek Orthodox clergy in its early stages. It is from this that 
a group of religious activists from AMAL split from the organization to make up the core 
of Hezbollah’s early membership.15  
Nasrallah studied religion at Najaf in Iraq under Musa Sadr, whose nephew 
Moqtada would rise to prominence in the aftermath of the American invasion of Iraq as a 
leader of the resistance to occupation. Nasrallah quickly rose through the Hezbollah 
ranks, making friends and enemies along the way, and was appointed Secretary General 
                                                 
14 Singer, P.W. “Defending Against Drones.” .ewsweek. 8 Mar. 2010. Singer notes that the Israelis were so 
unprepared for such drones that their F-16s nearly stalled while attempting to decelerate in order to shoot 
them down.  
15 Moos, Oliver. “Lebanon: Hizbullah, a progressive Islamic Party? – Interview with Joseph Alagha.” 
Religioscope. 17 May 2007. 
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in 1992, where he remains today, “detested by Israel and America but widely admired in 
much of the Muslim world.”16 Nasrallah has been credited for much of Hezbollah’s 
success in garnering legitimacy for the group, and has attained near celebrity status in the 
Muslim world. He received foreign dignitaries like UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in 
Amman, Jordan in the summer of 2000, not long before ordering the kidnapping of 
several Israeli soldiers to hold as bargaining chips.17  
 
Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, circa 2006.18 
 
While Nasrallah has remained the public face of Hezbollah to the world, it has 
been the success of the group’s armed exploits that has propelled the group to notoriety. 
As shown in the diagram below, Hezbollah’s organizational structure is highly 
developed, with Nasrallah at the top. Below him sits the decision-making Shura Council, 
which oversees operations by the Executive, Judicial and Political Councils, a Political 
Advisor, and finally the Jihad and Military Councils. It is the latter that remain the most 
troubling aspect of Hezbollah’s existence. Excluding the Military and Jihad Councils, the 
                                                 
16 Norton, Richard. Hezbollah. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. Print. p4.  
17 Ibid.  
18 Ynetnews.com. Accessed 2-12-10. 
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diagram clearly shows an evolved and effective political and social organization with far-
reaching objectives and abilities. However, Hezbollah would not exist today without the 
success of its armed factions.  
These armed groups are divided into three categories. Hezbollah’s Militia 
apparatus is the most visible and well-known force consisting of thousands of trained and 
well-equipped fighters operating in South Lebanon and southern Beirut. It is these 
fighters that receive the bulk of equipment and funds from Iran, and who are so often 
seen parading down Beirut streets with automatic weapons and green Hezbollah banners 
on the evening news. These are what would be considered the foot soldiers of Hezbollah, 
and represent a significant military presence in Lebanon and a legitimate threat to Israel 
in a conventional conflict. This was clearly demonstrated by the 34-day Summer War in 
2006, which drew to an inconclusive close but was claimed as a victory by Hezbollah for 
not suffering defeat by Israel and forcing the withdrawal of Israeli forces.   
Secondly, within the Jihad and Military Councils, operations against Israel are 
planned and carried out. These operations have included kidnappings, rocket attacks, 
infiltration, and roadside bombings, usually against Israeli military targets, though they 
have struck civilians in the past. Such operations are typically carried out by a smaller 
clique of highly-skilled operatives, who are often trained by Iranian Revolutionary 
Guards operating in Lebanon, or in Iran itself. These groups have also claimed a number 
of successes, including kidnapping Israeli soldiers to hold as bargaining chips, resulting 
in the successful negotiation for the release of hundreds of Palestinian and Lebanese 
prisoners held by Israel. Such successes have served to embolden Hezbollah, which has  
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Hezbollah maintains a highly-organized, centrally-directed bureaucratic structure, with all lower arms 
working to achieve the goals set by the decision-making Shura Council. 
19 
 
                                                 
19 “Hezbollah.” The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. Special Information Bulletin, June 
2003.  
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used them to great effect for propaganda purposes and to reinforce its central message 
that armed resistance can indeed be successful.  
The final component of Hezbollah’s armed operations are carried out by the most 
secretive and clandestine element, the External Security Organization (ESO). The most 
notorious of the armed factions as well as the most far-reaching, the ESO is responsible 
for Hezbollah’s intelligence, internal security, and overseas operating cells, and has been 
implicated in global terrorist operations including hijackings, assassinations, and 
bombings. One figure that has been implicated in many such operations and was known 
to be the chief of the ESO was a Lebanese named Imad Mughniyeh. This mysterious 
figure has been alternately described as the head of ESO, a member of the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRG), a special operative reporting directly to Iranian leader 
Khomeini, and a member of Hezbollah’s Supreme Council.20  
In reality, Mughniyeh was likely something of a hybrid, as evidence points to his 
intimate involvement in both Hezbollah and Iranian affairs at any given time, lending 
credibility to the assertions of Iranian involvement in several major bombings beginning 
in the early 1980s. He was indicted by Argentine authorities for the 1994 bombing of a 
Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, and was personally responsible for the 
hijacking of TWA flight 847 to Beirut in June 1985.21 Mughniyeh first made his presence 
known to the West when he was involved in a series of kidnappings of Western hostages 
during the Lebanese Civil War.  He was personally implicated in the kidnapping, torture, 
                                                 
20 Hudson, Rex. “The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?” The 
Library of Congress. Sept. 1999.  
21 Ibid.  
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and killing of William Buckley, the CIA station chief in Beirut in 1984, and was 
allegedly “the last person Buckley saw before he died.”22  
Mughniyeh was killed under mysterious circumstances in Damascus in 2008, 
alternately reported to have been killed while attempting to assemble a car bomb and also 
that he was assassinated by unknown forces, presumably Israel.  Until his death, 
Hezbollah leadership had repeatedly stuck to the line that Mughniyeh was not a member 
of the organization, and never had any contacts with Hezbollah officials. After his death, 
however, Mughniyeh was given a lavish and official funeral by Hezbollah, attended by 
none other than Sheik Hassan Nasrallah himself, who threatened in his eulogy to 
commence “open war” with Israel outside the Israel-Lebanon theater in a clear reference 
to the global reach that Mughniyeh helped to create.23  
 
From left: Imad Mugniyeh in 1985 holding TWA 847 hostage; Mugniyeh around the time of his death. 
 
An Iranian Proxy 
Iran has played an inseparable role in the formation and function of Hezbollah 
from the very beginning. As was noted above, Hezbollah continues to collect significant 
financial and logistical support from Iran, ideological inspiration aside.  US officials 
believe that Iran and Hezbollah are interlinked at nearly every level, to include training,   
                                                 
22 Kramer, Martin. “Imad Who?” Middle East Strategy at Harvard. 14 Feb. 2008 
23 Ibid.  
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funding, equipment, and logistical support to all aspects of the group’s operations. Before 
his death, Hezbollah External Security Organization chief Mughniyeh was also known to 
have maintained very close connections to the Iranian government.  
As recently as 2006, US intelligence officials claimed that Mughniyeh attended a 
meeting in Damascus along with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, with the 
leadership of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad also alleged to have been present. 
These reports indicated that Ahmadinejad was tapping Mughniyeh to ready any reprisals 
against Western targets in the event of a US or Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear 
facilities.24 Given Mughniyeh’s history with both Hezbollah and the Iranian government, 
it is quite plausible that these reports are at least partially accurate.  
Although it denies involvement in terrorist operations like those allegedly carried 
out by Mughniyeh, the Iranian government makes no apologies for its support to 
Hezbollah.  As has been widely reported, current president Ahmadinejad has called for 
the elimination of the state of Israel. Since the 1979 Islamic revolution, successive 
Iranian governments have made it official policy not to acknowledge Israel’s existence, 
and to support groups opposed to Israel, with Hezbollah as the most notable example. 
Some estimates contend that the Iranian government sends Hezbollah nearly $10 million 
a month. As the example of Imad Mughniyeh shows, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, 
and in particular the secretive Al-Quds (Jerusalem) Force of the Guards, has been pointed 
to as a primary provider of this support.  
                                                 
24 Baxter, Sarah. “Iran’s President Recruits Terror Master.” The Sunday Times. London. 23 Apr. 2006.  
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Historical Foundations of Hugo Chavez and Bolivarian Venezuela 
Chavez the Revolutionary Conspirator 
Before entering politics, Hugo Chavez led and helped organize an attempted coup 
against the elected government in 1992, as a member of the underground opposition 
group called the Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement (MBR-200).25 Chavez and several 
fellow military officers founded the MBR-200 as a secretive assembly of like-minded 
officers who had become disenchanted with Venezuelan politics, and especially with the 
government led by President Carlos Andres Perez. Chavez and other conspirators within 
the MBR-200 felt that their government was simply unable to deal with the problems that 
many Venezuelans faced, especially the poorer classes.  It became the mission of the 
MBR-200 to remedy this through whatever means necessary to fulfill what they 
perceived to have been intentions of their namesake, Simon Bolivar, for Latin America. 
These included a sound rejection of the dominance of free-market capitalism and what 
was seen as American “imperialism” and dominance of the Western hemisphere.  
Throughout the 1980’s, this underground group of officers made it their mission to 
indoctrinate as many members of the military as possible in order to secure a foundation 
for a future coup.  
The MBR-200 doctrine rejected status-quo Venezuelan politics, which they 
believed to have been corrupted beyond repair. As the group’s name suggests, members 
placed a heavy emphasis on the philosophy and objectives of “the liberator” -- famed 
Latin American general Simon Bolivar.  Bolivar was responsible for leading an army in 
revolt against Spanish rule across a large swath of the continent during the early 1800’s. 
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It was Bolivar who conceived the notion of a continent-wide crusade against the Spanish, 
and his success was predicated upon uniting the disparate Latin American states against a 
common outside enemy. Indeed, he found considerable success, defeating Spanish forces 
in Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia, though that success was often 
threatened and would prove to be relatively short-lived. However, Bolivar has retained 
his place in the popular imagination of Latin American leaders and citizens alike. 
Chavez, along with much of the revolutionary left at the time, was quick to grasp the 
value of identifying with Bolivar, and seems to truly believe in many of Bolivar’s initial 
goals. Namely, Chavez seeks the political unification of the aforementioned Latin 
American states, claiming that it would be “a valid project for the 21st century…. to bring 
together the Balkanized countries of Latin America.”26  
 Among the myriad reasons that MBR-200 plotted against the government was the 
perception, in many cases accurate, that the government was overburdened, corrupt, 
inefficient, and in the pocket of the wealthy elite. In the late 1980’s, Venezuela’s 
economy was in a shambles, and President Carlos Andres Perez had found it necessary to 
institute wide-ranging neo-liberal structural adjustment programs to the economy under 
the direction of the IMF and World Bank. On February 16, 1989 Perez announced the 
changes which included many free-market reforms to Venezuela’s highly-subsidized 
economy. The first changes to be instituted included an increase in the price of gasoline 
by nearly 100 percent over a several-month period. However, many public transit 
operators in Caracas simply increased it by the full percentage all at once on February 26, 
passing the increase on to passengers and nearly doubling bus fares overnight.27 This 
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outraged transit riders, and quickly led to a spontaneous public revolt and to what came to 
be known as the caracazo uprising of mass protest, rioting, and rebellion.  
 With uprisings spreading via television to other cities, the government became 
unable to quell the violence with police, and as National Guard units were sent in to 
assist, it quickly became clear that many were not willing to use force against fellow 
citizens. This led Perez to call on the military to quell the violence, brutally putting down 
the uprising and resulting in numerous deaths. Despite the violence and the military 
success, the specter of soldiers firing on their own countrymen led many officers to 
question their loyalties, causing a major upheaval within the ranks. Throughout the 
turbulence, Chavez remained ill at home, though several of his co-conspirators had been 
obliged to participate in the crackdown, hardening their anti-government positions.  
In February 1992, the MBR-200 attempted to seize power in a military coup, and 
though meeting some success in smaller towns, Chavez’ group in Caracas eventually was 
surrounded and he found himself without communication equipment with which to direct 
his forces and carry out the plan. Though popular support for the government was 
certainly not high, the majority of military commanders remained loyal to the 
democratically-elected president. This, combined with a series of logistical and 
preparatory blunders (as well as several conspirators’ cold feet), led Chavez to the rapid 
realization that the coup had no chance of success and would likely result in major 
bloodshed should it continue. Surrounded in Caracas, Chavez surrendered without firing 
a shot. Forty people died in the clashes resulting from the coup, and several hundred were 
injured. After giving up, Chavez was allowed to go on national TV to convince his 
supporters that the coup had failed and that resistance would only hurt the long-term 
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success of their cause. Though Chavez’ appeal likely spared many an otherwise violent 
fate, had the government been aware of Chavez’ choice of words during his brief 
television appearance, they may well have not allowed it. Indeed, Chavez made his 
intentions for a future comeback perfectly clear during his announcement of the coup’s 
failure, notably maintaining his belief in its underlying philosophy and righteousness of 
purpose: 
 
28 
 
“Comrades: unfortunately, for the moment the objectives that we had set for 
ourselves have not been achieved in the capital. That's to say that those of us here 
in Caracas have not been able to seize power. Where you are, you have performed 
well, but now is the time for a rethink; new possibilities will arise again, and the 
country will be able to move definitively towards a better future.”29 
 
 Important in this admission of failure was Chavez’ off-the-cuff inclusion of the 
phrase “for the moment” – an implicit promise to a newly-smitten public that Chavez 
would continue his Bolivarian struggle at some point in the future.  As noted by author 
Richard Gott, “No one in Venezuela had ever heard a politician apologize for anything 
before…and now here was a military officer saying he accepted responsibility for 
something that had gone wrong….the great mass of the population was solidly lining up 
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behind the coup leader.”30 In hindsight, it does appear that Chavez’ calculated surrender 
at the time has paid massive political dividends. After being released from prison in 1994 
following a pardon by President Perez, Chavez set about to reconstitute the MBR-200, 
and transform it from an underground military movement into a political party. Chavez 
called it the Fifth Republic Movement, as he believed that sweeping changes across the 
social and political landscape of the country were necessary, changes that would require a 
drastic alteration of the government of Venezuela. His message on the TV in those few 
minutes transformed him from the leader of a failed coup and a relatively unknown 
military officer into a national figure that captivated the public imagination.  
 
Chavez the Politician 
Hugo Chavez’ turned this overnight publicity into political capital that he 
intended to spend by cultivating a large base of support from a platform of populist 
reform. The platform of his Fifth Republic Movement espoused a unique blend of 
nationalism, socialism and populism that won many supporters, in particular among the 
country’s poor and working-class for whom the recent and dramatic neo-liberal economic 
programs had proved especially harmful. By 1998, Chavez had built up a large enough 
base of support to run for president, a post he won with over 56% of the vote.31  Once in 
office, Chavez called for a new Constitutional Assembly in line with his vision for the 
new Venezuela and its rejection of the neo-liberal economic order. Like any incoming 
administration, Chavez filled key posts with his own political advisors and benefactors. 
In this, though, Chavez began to veer away from any of his predecessors with the 
                                                 
30 Ibid, p. 68.  
31 Romero, Juan Eduardo. “The Political Process in Venezuela in the Late 20th Century: The Construction 
of a New Order.” Sincronia. Winter Issue, 2001.  
   
 24 
creation of entirely new cabinet positions, ministries, and government agencies, all 
designed to promote his vision of a radial social transformation.  
Making many of his cabinet ministers nervous was the introduction of military 
officers into nearly all senior levels of government. As one economic advisor put it, “The 
military are everywhere…it sometimes seems as though there is a secret project that you 
don’t quite know about. There really is a military party and in some cases, it’s a case of 
dual power.” 32 Thanks to a law written specially for him in the new constitution of 1999, 
Chavez remains an active-duty military officer, as do nearly one-third of all regional 
governors.33 
Chavez was keen to maintain the loyalty of the military, many of whom had 
participated in quelling his failed 1992 coup. Despite this, Chavez was a freely elected 
president and the officer corps had no choice but to accept his leadership. Many officers 
who participated in suppressing the 1992 coup or were thought to be sympathetic to it 
were forced out of the armed forces in short order.34 After all, few knew better than 
Chavez the possible consequence of discontent in the officer corps.  
Despite these radical changes, Chavez was careful to avoid alienating any large 
sections of the public. He took an incremental approach, and at first some economic 
analysts believed his changes to be more cosmetic than anything else. Venezuela is a 
major oil producer - a primary supplier of crude to the US that relies heavily on foreign 
investment in this large sector of its economy. It would have been foolish to promote 
instability and uncertainty at such an early stage of his administration, and Chavez acted 
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cautiously in balancing the concerns of foreign investors with the needs of his new 
economic program.  
His initial economic and political reforms and the popularity of his leadership 
matched well with the bold aspirations of his foreign policy agenda. However, like his 
idol Bolivar, Chavez set out with goals far more ambitious than his ability to achieve 
them. Chavez’ plans for the unification of the continent and the formation of a Latin 
American bloc of states have so far been met with relative silence by other Latin 
American leaders, who have never “perceived Venezuela as a natural political leader on 
the continent.”35  
Many of Chavez’ Latin American counterparts were also wary of his radical 
economic and political agenda and were unwilling to risk their good relations with the 
United States – “the empire to the north” whom Chavez had already identified as his 
primary antagonist and chief geopolitical and ideological rival. His election was greeted 
by the US with growing concern as he made clear his views on the creation of an “open 
and multi-polar world,” which did not follow “the neo-liberalism that had been such a 
disaster in the third world and had tried to impose economic models from the center of 
power in the West; it had resulted in millions of people leading lives of poverty, and had 
led to unemployment, misery, and death.” 36  
By contrast, Bolivarian socialism was to emphasize the poor and lower class, 
which by the time of his candidacy made up a considerable portion of the electorate and 
played no small part in his victory. As a populist, Chavez highlighted Venezuela’s 
growing levels of wealth disparity despite its relatively high national income and oil 
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wealth. By 1995, estimates contended that of a population of 23 million, nearly half of 
the national income was held by only 10 percent of the population, that 40 percent lived 
in “critical poverty,” and that 80 percent earned the minimum wage or less.37 Chavez 
vowed to change this, and though he has not explicitly outlined his economic philosophy, 
he has characterized it as “neither statist nor neo-liberal; exploring the middle ground, 
where the invisible hand of the market joins up with the visible hand of the state: as much 
state as necessary, and as much market as possible.”38 While vague, Chavez has so far 
managed to reassure foreign investors and oil companies that no drastic action would be 
undertaken and that their investments would be protected, while also persuading the 
public that he sought to uitilize state power to steer the market in support of advancing all 
citizens’ interests – a balance that initially succeeded in quelling major opposition. 
To that end, Chavez has been remarkably effective, though not without his critics. 
Actions to nationalize foreign companies have not sat well with foreign firms, and many 
in the Venezuelan elite have protested strongly at his wealth redistribution plans. In a 
worrisome move, his government began finding (and creating) laws by which to shut 
down opposition media and stifle dissent. Laws passed by Chavez loyalists have made it 
a crime to publicly show disrespect for the president and other governmental authorities, 
punishable by up to 20 months in prison. Likewise, the 2004 Social Responsibility Law 
gave the government the authority to censor media content by imposing “administrative 
restrictions” on radio and television broadcasts.39  
Much of the Venezuelan elite despised Chavez’ radical changes. Especially hated 
were his land reform policies that gave the government power to take over land that was 
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either idle or unproductive as well as his reversal of oil privatization programs initiated 
by previous governments.40 By late 2001, opposition had spilled from the airwaves to the 
streets, and the weeks progressed marked by escalating street demonstrations by Chavez 
supporters and the opposition. By April of 2002, members of the country’s elite as well 
as several high-ranking generals set in motion an attempted coup, similar in many ways 
to the one Chavez undertook in 1992.  
However, the coup plotters, despite briefly deposing Chavez, did not count on 
huge numbers of the country’s poor streaming into the city to protest the coup, nor did 
they foresee the resistance of much of the officer corps to the attempt. Chavez’ success in 
purging his officer corps had paid off, as had his populist message. In the aftermath, 
Chavez accused the US of orchestrating and backing the attempt -- charges not without 
some merit.41 This marked a turning point for US-Venezuela relations. Chavez defeated a 
2002 recall referendum orchestrated by opposition groups that cemented his domestic 
popularity and enhanced his anti-American rhetoric and credentials.  It also hastened his 
embrace of Iran, which he saw as a natural ally whose leadership shared many 
similarities in its geopolitical outlook. Like Venezuela, Iran sought a global opposition 
movement to the US, and it felt strategically threatened by the presence of American 
forces in its US-allied regional neighbors.  This well-calculated marriage of convenience 
would enhance Chavez’ global exposure. He quickly became a polarizing world figure, a 
position from which he has not shied away and indeed appears to relish. 
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Resistance Ideology 
Radical Islam and Resistance as Doctrine  
 As evidenced by Hezbollah remaining armed after the Taif Accords, the concept 
of resistance has been a recurring theme in radical Islamic thought. From the Crusades in 
the middle ages through today, examples abound of Islamic leaders rallying around a 
banner of resistance to invasion, imperialism, religious persecution, and foreign 
domination. Among the most prominent founding fathers of this school of thought was 
13th century Islamic scholar Taqi-ud-Deen Ahmad ibn Tamiyyah. He remains one of the 
most influential writers on the concept of jihad as an offensive struggle against all 
enemies of Islam: “Since lawful warfare is essentially jihad and since its aim is that the 
religion is Allah’s entirely and Allah’s word is uppermost, therefore, according to all 
Muslims, those who stand in the way of this aim must be fought.”42 
Ibn Tamiyyah lived during the period of Mongol rule throughout much of the 
Muslim world. He was a vocal opponent of subjugation by outsiders whom he considered 
to be unbelievers and apostates.43 It was in this context that ibn Tamiyya formulated 
some of his most notable philosophical ideas, many of which have been adapted by 
today’s jihadist movements and expanded upon.  In the 1950’s, an Egyptian named 
Sayyid Qutb would seize on many of the same principles to write several highly 
influential works on jihad and resistance.44 Like ibn Tamiyya, Qutb would become 
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required reading for modern jihadist thought. Indeed, it is difficult to find a modern 
jihadist work without reference to the ideas originally formulated by ibn Tamiyya and 
elaborated by Qutb. The concept of jihad as an obligation, especially in cases when non-
Muslims or apostates are seen to be the aggressor, has remained an enticing justification 
for groups like Hezbollah to promote armed resistance today.  
Though the concept is certainly not unique to Islamists, radical Islamic groups in 
recent years have taken center stage in highlighting the plight of the downtrodden and the 
need to assign blame upon a larger foe. In some cases, that enemy is identified as the 
West, the United States, Israel, or a combination of the three. In others, it is more broadly 
defined as an anti-imperialist movement.  In most Arab and many European countries, a 
distinction is made between Hezbollah’s political and social organizations and its violent 
activities, and thus it is not classified as a terrorist group.45  
Both states and non-state actors opposed to the current geopolitical order find 
inspiration in Hezbollah’s success, and have made attempts in recent years to organize 
into a more coherent body politic.  In January 2009, 400 delegates from around the world 
attended the Beirut International Forum for Resistance, Anti-Imperialism, Solidarity 
between Peoples and Alternatives.  The stated purpose of this forum was to bring 
together anti-imperialist forces from around the world to help establish a unity of purpose 
among both secular left-leaning forces and Islamic and other religious groups.  
The conference included representatives from numerous fringe groups in several 
Western nations including the United States and Europe, but was also attended by an 
official delegation from Hezbollah as well as nearly 30 representatives of the government 
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of Venezuela. Included among those were members of the Venezuelan parliament, as 
well as union delegates and members of left-leaning youth groups.46 At the opening 
session of the conference, Hezbollah deputy general secretary Sheik Naim Qassem 
declared, “There are two camps in the world, that of imperialism, led by the United 
States, and that of resistance.”47   
Hezbollah has recently been looked upon by anti-imperialist factions as a poster 
child for modern resistance to many of the aforementioned foes. It has been identified as 
one of the only “example[s] of successful, targeted and organized resistance,” in part 
because it was credited with forcing the withdrawal of Israeli forces from south Lebanon 
in 2000. 48  A key problem with this outlook is that it attempts to legitimate and elevates 
the use of armed struggle and terrorism to achieve a desired political end, in this case a 
perceived victory against Israel.  This newfound credibility throughout the wider sphere 
of anti-imperialists across the globe has given Hezbollah significant political capital in 
Lebanon and elsewhere. Hugo Chavez’ Bolivarian revolutionaries see in Hezbollah’s 
success a model of resistance to be praised and indeed emulated.  
 
Hugo Chavez’ Identification with Resistance 
 Hugo Chavez and his Bolivarian revolutionary ideology share many of the 
underlying social and anti-imperialist views of radical Islam.  The Bolivarian socialist 
project of Chavez’ government is predicated upon engendering a strong sense of national 
identity upon ordinary citizens, but also upon regaining “independence” from what is 
perceived to be a neocolonial world order.  While the Iranian revolution took place under 
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vastly different circumstances and with a specific religious emphasis, a fundamental 
similarity between the two remains the rejection of American influence in each state’s 
respective affairs.  
Central to both Iranian and Bolivarian ideologies is the concept of social justice. It 
emphasizes the need to strive for the equality of all mankind, especially with regard to the 
poor and otherwise underserved for whom no real political voice has been previously 
granted.49 In 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini led the Iranian revolution with calls for an 
Islamic state in which justice would prevail and the oppressive forces of the US-backed 
shah would be vanquished. Hugo Chavez found similarly fertile ground among 
Venezuela’s poor by projecting his revolutionary ideology as a solution to many years of 
neglect at the hands of the elite and powerful. Both instances similarly held that the new 
revolutionary force would sweep away all vestiges of the old and corrupt power. 
Necessary for this transition, though, was the identification of a central foe over which to 
triumph. In both cases, this fundamental enemy was held up as the United States. The US 
was portrayed as the source of each state’s problems that only the respective revolutions 
could successfully overcome.  
The ability of both Chavez and the Iranian leadership to reconcile Venezuela’s 
current socialist agenda with Iran’s Islamic revolutionary ideology represents a strategic 
partnership that is mutually beneficial to each state, but which is also grounded in 
fundamentally similar social outlooks.  This partnership allows Chavez to claim broad-
based international support against Western imperialism and aggression, but at a cost that 
may come home to roost for Chavez domestically.   
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Chavez’ Venezuela and Iran share status as pariahs of the United States, and both 
claim leadership of nations dedicated to creating a multi-polar world no longer dominated 
by America.  In a meeting with Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, in July of 
2009, Chavez agreed to enhance the two states’ cooperation, both economically and 
politically.  Khamenei called on the two nations to “consolidate the newly-formed 
independence front,” with Chavez agreeing that both Iran and Venezuela “should help 
revolutionary nations by strengthening ties between the two nations.”50  Chavez has also 
called Iranian President Ahmadinejad his “ideological brother,” stating that “co-operation 
of independent countries such as Iran and Venezuela has an effective role in defeating the 
policies of imperialism and saving nations.”51 
In July 2008, the pro-government Venezuelan newspaper Diario Vea ran an 
editorial highlighting the close connections between the “oppressed” classes in Lebanon 
and Latin America.  The article advocated solidarity between the two “brother 
homelands,” and claimed that the “bourgeoisie” of Lebanon and Latin America are 
“…today, more than ever before, demonstrating their shameful role as servile to U.S. 
imperialism and international Zionism.”52 In March 2008, Hugo Chavez labeled 
Colombia the “Israel of Latin America,” drawing a parallel between Israeli strikes on 
Palestinians and Colombian military cross-border raids on guerilla camps in Ecuador.53 
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Warm greetings between Chavez and Ahmadinejad54 
 
One can view Chavez and the FARC as a parallel to Iran and Hezbollah, highlighting 
Chavez’ stance against “imperialist” U.S.-backed Colombia, much as Hezbollah stands 
against U.S.-backed Israel.  Labeling Colombia the “Israel of Latin America” allows 
Chavez to demonstrate his solidarity with the Palestinian cause and with Iran (and its 
proxy Hezbollah) through a shared anti-American and anti-Zionist platform.   
The concept of resistance is a key part of Bolivarian revolutionary thought.  
Chavez has made it a priority since his first election to decouple Venezuela from 
perceived American influence, and to strongly assert Venezuelan and Latin American 
identity as a counterweight to such influence within the region.  As part of this 
counterweight, pro-government media outlets in Venezuela have made a point to identify 
clear links between Venezuela’s socialist agenda and the struggles in the Middle East.  
The labeling of Colombia appears to be an attempt by Chavez to generate support from 
Iran and other anti-American nations in the Middle East by couching his regional 
political agenda in terms to which they can very clearly relate. 
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Latin American Support to Terrorist Groups 
Chavez and the FARC   
Hugo Chavez has consistently emphasized his opposition to American military 
support for neighboring Colombia, which has been fighting a decades-long guerilla war 
with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).  Both Chavez and the FARC 
are members of the Sao Paulo Forum (FSP), an organization “which brings together 
nearly every leftist organization in Iberian America, including armed guerrilla 
movements.”55  The FSP was formed by a group of communist parties and leftist 
governments to examine the direction of leftist policy in the region following the collapse 
of the USSR in 1991. The group aims to place its members in positions of power in Latin 
America in order to counter the expansion of free trade regimes and neo-liberal economic 
trends in the region by emphasizing socialism as an alternative economic model.56  
Chavez’ support for the FARC has come under scrutiny as his government has 
been accused of complicity in providing weapons and other material support to FARC. 
Chavez’ support of FARC has also caused considerable tension within the Venezuelan 
armed forces, not least because of his role in the 1992 coup attempt. One high-ranking 
former Venezuelan military officer who overlapped with Chavez for one year at the 
Venezuelan Military Academy recounted being forced to retire by Chavez due to his 
known opposition to the 1992 military coup, and he has since fled the country for the 
safety of his family. At the beginning of Chavez’ presidency, however, Gen. Dagoberto 
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Rodriguez Lozada regularly toured military operations across the country as part of his 
duties as Deputy Inspector General of the National Armed Forces.  
 
Map of FARC-controlled territory. Note that much of it borders Venezuela in La Guajira region.57 
 
 
Lozada recounted that during one such inspection of an area of operations (AOR) 
in La Guajira near the Colombian border, a sergeant approached him with troubling 
news. The sergeant recounted to Lozada that the commanding officer of that particular 
AOR was under direct orders from Chavez’ government not to fight the Colombian 
rebels who had set up camp in Venezuelan territory. Quite the contrary, the sergeant 
noted that he and his unit had actually met and played soccer with Colombian guerrillas, 
a far cry from the stated mission of ensuring Venezuelan sovereignty in the border 
region.58 As if to reinforce the point, Chavez’ former top military advisor, Gen. Alberto 
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Muller Rojas, has unequivocally stated about the FARC that “[S]topping them is not our 
job…we don't have to incur expenses to contain an enemy that is not our enemy. That's 
their [Colombia’s] job."59 
Colombia finds itself with a hostile neighbor actively supporting an armed 
insurrection within its borders – a clear violation of international law. So Colombia has 
taken the battle to FARC sanctuaries in its neighbors’ territory, actions viewed by Chavez 
and his leftist allies in the region as acts of aggression. However, such hostile rhetoric by 
Chavez appears to be little more than that: rhetoric. This could perhaps be because 
Colombian raids into neighboring countries’ FARC camps have indeed proved highly 
successful in both eliminating FARC leadership, and in exposing cooperation between 
the FARC and leftist governments in the region, including Venezuela. Documents seized 
by Colombian forces during a raid on a camp in neighboring Ecuador detail how rocket-
propelled grenades and ground-to-air rocket launchers were sold by Sweden to 
Venezuela. These then ended up in FARC hands.60  
During the raid on the FARC camp in Ecuador, electronic documents were found 
that detailed campaign contributions by FARC to Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa, a 
Chavez ally.61  Video seized by Colombian police in Bogota from a FARC operative’s 
home shows FARC second-in-command Jorge Bricenco giving a speech lamenting the 
loss of FARC secrets in the raid in which documents allude to agreements between 
FARC and the Venezuelan and Ecuadorian governments.62  Though both governments 
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deny these claims, they point to a larger pattern of support for such groups, and indeed 
complement Chavez’ own ideological affinity for the FARC. 
A shared ideological foundation, combined with a desire to see Colombia’s 
current U.S.-friendly government toppled, may have led Chavez to conclude that not only 
is his tacit support of FARC not harmful, but actually beneficial.  Indeed, Chavez does 
not consider FARC to be a terrorist organization. The Venezuelan legislature has recently 
backed Chavez’ call to afford belligerent status to FARC.  This would recognize the 
group as a legitimate fighting force within Colombia and would afford FARC certain 
rights under international law and the laws of armed conflict. 63 Support for groups like 
FARC appear indicative of Chavez’ willingness to, at minimum, adopt a policy of benign 
neglect towards organizations and governments based primarily on mutual opposition to 
the United States.  
 
Radical Islamic Links to the Venezuelan Government  
Accusations of direct state support to terrorist groups have in the past involved 
states in the Middle East like Iran or Libya. However, recent activity by members of 
Hugo Chavez’ government has provided concrete evidence that within the ranks of his 
administration are individuals with radical Islamist sympathies and connections. 
Venezuelan diplomat Ghazi Nasr al-Din spent several years as ambassador to Damascus 
and Beirut.  In 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department alleged that Nasr al-Din used his 
position in Lebanon to facilitate travel arrangements for Hezbollah operatives into 
Venezuela, and for Hezbollah sympathizers in Venezuela to travel to Lebanon for 
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military training in Hezbollah-run camps.64  He has reportedly provided financial donors 
with advice regarding specific bank accounts to transfer funds accessible to Hezbollah in 
Lebanon, and he allegedly arranged travel for Hezbollah operatives to attend training 
camps in Iran.65 
 A Venezuelan of Syrian descent named Tarek El-Aissami was appointed by 
Chavez as chief of the Venezuelan Identification and Immigration Directorate, ONIDEX. 
ONIDEX is responsible for Venezuelan border controls and the issuance of passports and 
national ID cards.66  While heading ONIDEX, Aissami oversaw the inauguration of direct 
airline flights between Tehran and Caracas, and some reporting indicates that Iranians 
traveling on these flights are subject to only the most cursory customs inspections.67  
Aissami’s father is the president of the Venezuelan Ba’ath Party, and his great-uncle was 
an assistant to the party secretary in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.68 Before the invasion of Iraq 
in 2003, Aissami’s father held a press conference in which he praised “the great 
Mujahedeen, Sheik Osama bin Laden,” and even said he considered himself to be a 
Taliban.69   
 Like Chavez, Aissami has been an outspoken critic of Israel, and has exhibited a 
flair for the dramatic in his defense of the Palestinian cause. His speeches bear a strong 
resemblance to those of radical Islamists like Hassan Nasrallah. In one notable instance in 
January 2009, Aissami attended a Caracas mosque where he spoke to the congregation. 
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In his remarks, Aissami stated “Beyond my mission as minister, I am also an Arab, I am a 
Palestinian, and I am an Iraqi and today we are the force of resistance against the 
genocide being committed by Israel in the Gaza Strip.”70 In his remarks, Aissami 
attempted to demonstrate solidarity with the Palestinian cause and link that struggle with 
the foundation of the Bolivarian revolution in Venezuela, claiming: 
“Palestine deserves to be free and that is why I have no hesitation in saying that 
here in Venezuela is a piece of Palestine and that Palestine is a piece of 
Venezuela…Our [Bolivarian] revolution is a revolution also fighting for a free 
Palestine and here we are ready to offer all our lives, if necessary. We have 
dignity and the dignity today which powers the Bolivarian revolution is the same 
rising in Palestine against the Israeli genocide.”71  
 
72 
Venezuelan Interior Minister Tarek El-Aissami, addressing a Caracas mosque in January 2009 on 
Venezuelan solidarity with the Palestinian cause. 
 
 One striking aspect of the above quotations is that Aissami’s remarks were carried 
in official, government-controlled Venezuelan media, Venezuela National Radio, 
indicating tacit endorsement of these positions by Chavez’ government. Far from 
disqualifying Assami from holding such an important post, these radical sympathies were 
of no concern to Chavez who, in September 2008, actually promoted Aissami to become 
Minister of Interior and Justice, a post responsible for Venezuelan internal state 
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security.73  Thus emerges the prospect of Hezbollah operatives using official Venezuelan 
documentation to travel north to the United States. Hezbollah has already demonstrated 
its ability to cooperate with Mexican drug cartels to utilize smuggling techniques and 
routes in order to bring drugs and people into the United States.  In 2001, a Lebanese man 
named Mahmoud Youssef Kourani crossed the Mexican border illegally into the US and 
drove a car all the way to Dearborn, Michigan.  Kourani was later convicted of providing 
“material support and resources” to Hezbollah.74  Through such cooperation with drug 
cartels, Hezbollah operatives can repeat Kourani’s infiltration with operational intent. 
While the FBI states that no operations have yet been carried out against domestic US 
targets by Hezbollah, it shows a proven ability of the group to infiltrate through the 
southern border.  
In the 1990s Hezbollah carried out attacks well outside the Israel-Lebanon theater 
of operations.  Hezbollah was accused, with Iranian complicity, of two attacks against 
Jewish and Israeli targets in Buenos Aires, Argentina.  In the first attack in 1992, 30 
people were killed when the Israeli Embassy was bombed. Two years later, 85 people 
were killed when the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association of Buenos Aires was 
bombed.75  Hezbollah and Iran deny responsibility for the attacks. After an extensive 
investigation, the Argentine government indicted nine people in November 2006 who 
were wanted in connection with the bombings. Among those indicted included the 
notorious Hezbollah operative Imad Mughniyehh as well as eight Iranian government 
officials.76  None have been subsequently arrested or brought to trial.  
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Hezbollah Activities in Latin America 
Apart from the significant Iranian financial contributions to Hezbollah, allegations 
of alternative funding methods have become increasingly numerous and widespread.77 
The large Lebanese expatriate community around the world has been pointed to as a 
primary source of this additional funding. Hezbollah channels expatriate donations 
through sympathetic charity organizations as well as through large-scale smuggling 
operations and cooperation with drug cartels. The wide variety of organizations and 
mechanisms designed to send money to Hezbollah from overseas is quite staggering. In 
the Western Hemisphere alone, authorities have made arrests in dozens of cases 
involving illegal schemes in which profits were funneled back to Hezbollah.  
These included money laundering, drug trafficking, racketeering operations, and 
smuggling.  In several notable instances, evidence points to the intermixing of Hezbollah 
operatives and fundraisers with drug cartels, organized crime, and paramilitary rebel 
groups in neighboring states. Links can be found to the highest levels of the Venezuelan 
government, with some evidence pointing to the tacit support of Chavez himself to 
Colombian rebel groups operating near or in Venezuelan territory. As will be explored 
further, evidence indicates that some of these groups actively cooperate with Hezbollah 
on multiple levels.  
 
The Hawala System of Money Transfer 
One instrument which plays a significant role in these transactions is the 
traditional Islamic system of hawala, which in its basic form amounts to an informal 
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money transfer system between networks of individuals across the Middle East, the Horn 
of Africa, and South Asia. A hawala transaction bypasses banks and other traditional 
financial institutions to carryout a transaction quickly and without any records.78 Hawala 
transactions are based on the honor system, and typically, an individual who wishes to 
send money overseas or across long distances hands his or her money to a hawala dealer, 
or hawaladar, who can offer better exchange rates, lower fees, and anonymity. The 
hawaladar then contacts another hawaladar in the recipient’s area who will disburse the 
desired funds to the recipient.79  In effect, no money has actually been transferred, only a 
verbal agreement to repay it, thus the transaction is untraceable. This makes hawala an 
ideal method for individuals to send financial support to groups like Hezbollah while 
avoiding the authorities and retaining anonymity.  
80 
           The Hawala System is ideal for those wishing to send money discreetly. 
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Unintentional Donors 
It must be noted that the existence of a large Lebanese expatriate community in 
Venezuela and other parts of the region does not by itself indicate nefarious activity.  
Distinctions must be made between the majority existing peacefully in Latin America and 
those for whom such activity and terrorist connections are evident. Financial remittances 
to family and friends in Lebanon are a widespread practice, and one not likely to be 
curtailed as they contribute significantly to the economy of their home country.  Indeed, 
according to the International Monetary Fund, remittances were estimated to make up 
nearly 20% of Lebanon’s GDP by 2008.81 These remittances are sent not only to 
individuals, but to local Lebanese charities and social-service providers that supplement a 
lack of government services in many areas.  
Hezbollah is a significant political actor in Lebanon and it operates a large 
network of social services throughout the country. It operates medical clinics and job-
placement centers, which do serve legitimate purposes for many citizens in need.  This is 
significant because money provided for these services comes from Hezbollah’s general 
fund, which is also used to finance its armed wing.82 As a result, money sent from an 
expatriate Lebanese in Latin America could very conceivably find its way to Hezbollah’s 
coffers and end up funding its military wing without the sender’s consent or knowledge.  
It is thus imperative to highlight those individuals and organizations that do so 
intentionally as well as those that facilitate such actions. 
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Documented Deliberate Support  
 Of course, not all individual donations to Hezbollah are collected and sent 
unintentionally, and these are of primary concern. These donors make it their mission to 
support Hezbollah, such as the case of a Lebanese emigrant to Paraguay named Assad 
Ahmad Barakat who was arrested in 2002 as the alleged ringleader of a financial network 
which funneled large sums of money to Hezbollah.83  Authorities found a letter in one of 
his businesses, purportedly from Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, stating 
that Nasrallah was “most thankful for the contributions Assad Ahmad Barakat has sent 
from the Triple Border,” a reference to the so-called tri-border area between Paraguay, 
Brazil and Argentina.  Though the authenticity of this letter has not been clearly 
established, Barakat’s arrest highlights the ability of Hezbollah support networks to 
operate in Latin American territory. 84  
Two of the most prominent communities in Latin America with large Arab 
populations are Venezuela’s Margarita Island, and the Colombian town of Maicao. 
Maicao is located on the border with Venezuela on the La Guajira peninsula.  The town 
of Maicao has an Arab population of only 8,000 out of 58,000, but it is alleged to control 
nearly seventy percent of all commerce in the town, and many of its Arab residents are 
reported to give between ten and thirty percent of their incomes to Hezbollah, through 
banks in Venezuela and Panama.85 In July 2009, the Israeli foreign ministry publicly 
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accused Hezbollah of operating a cell in La Guajira, where it alleged that mosques in the 
region collect funds which are then sent on to Hezbollah in Lebanon.86   
For its part, Margarita Island is a small speck of land northeast of Caracas run 
largely by Arab merchants from Lebanon and Iran. Located on Margarita is the 
Venezuelan-Arab Friendship Association, which despite its location on an isolated 
tropical island, has been described in news reports as a “fortress with armed guards 
outside,” a clear indicator of the not-so-friendly business taking place inside its walls. 87 
In prepared testimony, US Southern Command Gen. James Hill noted that Hezbollah, 
Hamas, and the Islamic militant group Islamiyya al Gammat all operate cells on 
Margarita.88 
Precise levels of alleged financial support have not been made available in these 
cases. Likewise, it is also impossible to estimate to what extent any financial support to 
Hezbollah from these areas is intentional, or simply represent incidents of local charities 
funneling donations from unwitting and otherwise pious and peaceful Muslims. What is 
apparent is that large sums of money are being intercepted from these areas in transit to 
Hezbollah in Lebanon, and they are coming from multiple sources through multiple 
channels. Clearly, support for Hezbollah exists at least in some fashion in these regions, 
leading to the most troubling and urgent question as to what extent it reaches. Does it 
simply represent small groups and individuals whose sympathies lead them to donate to 
the resistance in their homeland, or does it have the potential to metastasize into 
operational support should the impetus arise? 
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A map depicting areas of suspected Hezbollah support in Colombia and Venezuela. 
 
Links between Hezbollah, Drug Cartels, and Organized Crime 
 Hezbollah has been linked to Latin American drug cartels and crime syndicates 
around Latin America, and even in the United States.  Indeed, as recently as June 2009, 
authorities on the Dutch Caribbean island of Curacao arrested seventeen suspects on 
drug-trafficking charges. They allege that these individuals were part of a major money-
laundering and drug-smuggling operation which shipped drugs from Latin America to the 
Middle East and Europe.89  While these sorts of arrests may be relatively common within 
the wider context of the drug war in Latin America, Dutch authorities accuse the 
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organization of funneling part of their profits directly to Hezbollah through informal 
banking mechanisms such as the Hawala system.90 
 That same month, the Colombian Supreme Court approved the extradition of 
Oscar Serna Acosta, known as “Beto,” to the United States, where he is wanted on drug-
trafficking charges.  “Beto” and several others are accused of being members of the 
Medellin-based paramilitary group “Office of Envigado,” which Colombian authorities 
claim maintains connections with Hezbollah through its drug-smuggling operations to the 
Middle East.91  
Earlier, in October 2008 authorities in Colombia and overseas arrested over one 
hundred suspects in a similar drug-smuggling and money-laundering operation. 
According to the Colombian attorney general’s office, three of those arrested were Arabs 
living in Colombia who were alleged to operate front companies that sent a portion of 
their drug profits to Hezbollah.92  Numerous similar charges have been made, linking 
Hezbollah to Colombian cartels, paramilitary groups, and money-laundering operations. 
Though no part of any indictment has asserted that Hezbollah intended to undertake 
operations, collectively they demonstrate the willingness and ability of the drug cartels to 
work with Hezbollah in funneling profits and sharing logistics networks. With one foot in 
the door of the cartels’ networks, it is highly conceivable that Hezbollah could exploit 
these connections for purposes beyond mere funding.   
Hezbollah denies any involvement with organized crime and drug-smuggling, and 
has claimed that attempts to link it to such activities are part of a “misleading Zionist 
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imperialist campaign” to slander it.93  However, Hezbollah has a demonstrated track 
record of support for both drug trafficking and drug production. The area of Lebanon 
where Hezbollah originates and maintains a strong base of support and recruitment is the 
Bekaa Valley, which is a hub of drug cultivation, including cannabis and poppy plants 
that are grown in abundance and sold both locally and abroad to European consumers.94 
One need only take Hezbollah at its word, in a Hezbollah fatwa in the 1980’s that 
explicitly stated that the group was “making these drugs for Satan – America and the 
Jews. If we cannot kill them with guns we will kill them with drugs.”95   
Iran has also been linked to similar operations.  In 2008 El Universal reported that 
the Mexican Sinaloa drug cartel was sending elite assassins to train on weapons and 
explosives with Islamic radicals in Iran.96  The article reported that this travel was 
facilitated through Venezuela, courtesy of the direct airline flights established between 
the two countries, and that some of the operatives even used Venezuelan travel 
documents.97  This mutually beneficial arrangement allowed the assassins to receive 
training in guerilla tactics, while the extremists gained entry into Latin America, and 
possibly the Untied States. The article went so far as to claim that some extremist group 
members were purchasing marriages to local Venezuelan and Mexican nationals in order 
to take on Latino surnames, increasing ease of entry into the US.98  Taken together, these 
reports indicate extensive associations between Iran, Hezbollah and drug cartels, 
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highlighting the potential for Hezbollah to utilize these groups’ existing support networks 
and infrastructure.  
 
Hezbollah Venezuela: Clear Threat or Wannabe Terrorists? 
A group calling itself “Hezbollah Venezuela” emerged in July 2005, claiming to 
have gained followers sympathetic to the radical Islamic ideology, and gained 
prominence within Venezuela during the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah in 
Lebanon.99  The leader of this group, Teodoro Darnott, initially did not claim that his 
group was a cell of Lebanese Hezbollah. However, his group’s emergence underscores 
the level of influence that radical groups like Hezbollah can have at a local level halfway 
across the world.  The lack of a large indigenous Islamic community led Darnott to wrap 
his group’s mantra around the local Wayuu Indian tribe, for whom a pre-existing culture 
of resistance to oppression laid a foundation for radical Islamist thought and 
indoctrination.100   
 This underlying ideology of resistance is shared not only by the revolutionary 
philosophy espoused by Hugo Chavez and his Bolivarian socialists, but also by many 
Muslims already in Latin America.  Many Muslims in Colombia adhere to the notion that 
becoming a Muslim is less about conversion to a new religion than it is the regaining of a 
much older cultural identity. They emphasize what they consider to be “natural cultural 
and even ethnic links to Arabs and Muslims, stemming from Spain’s Islamic Moorish 
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heritage.”101  They contend that the Roman Catholic tradition that the conquistadors 
brought to Latin America is yet another example of Western imperialism and 
colonialism. Hence, Islam is touted as away to regain a lost culture, and reassert an 
identity long-suppressed by colonial forces.  
A closer examination of Hezbollah Venezuela’s websites demonstrates a rather 
inept and elementary attempt to mirror the success of Lebanese Hezbollah, with limited 
success.  The aforementioned lack of an indigenous Islamic community in Latin America 
may explain some of these website incongruities. The group’s websites very perceptibly 
lacked a basic knowledge of Islam, going so far as to post Bible verses rather than 
quotations from the Koran.102 Far from the polish and professionalism of official 
Hezbollah websites, which resemble established news outlets in their sophistication, 
Hezbollah Venezuela’s amateurish website design nevertheless is significant in that it 
shares some of the same basic rhetoric and symbolism with other jihadist groups as well 
as a strong anti-American message.103  
Hezbollah Venezuela under Darnott lasted only a few months before he was 
arrested November of 2006 by Hugo Chavez’ government. He was charged with a failed 
attack on the U.S. embassy in Caracas in which two small explosive devices were to be 
detonated, scattering the groups’ literature into the streets.104  The attack failed when the 
man who placed the explosives panicked and was arrested, and the bombs were defused 
before they could be set off.  Regardless of the failure, Hezbollah Venezuela took public 
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credit for the attack, and praised the failed (and jailed) attacker as a “brother 
Mujahedeen…the first prisoner of the revolutionary Islamic Movement Hezbollah 
Venezuela.” 105   
106 
From left: Teodoro Darnott; Hezbollah Venezuela member holding what appears to be an explosive device. 
 
Before Darnott’s arrest, Hezbollah Venezuela’s website openly praised Hugo 
Chavez’ revolutionary government and its socialist bent, though with the caveat that 
Hezbollah Venezuela seeks to move beyond Chavez’ Bolivarian socialism and represents 
the precursor to a theocratic system which seeks to “obey divine rules.” 107 Before 
acknowledging his groups’ responsibility in the explosive plot, Darnott carried on his 
activities in the open, including registering his websites with free web services like MSN 
Groups under his own name and prominently displaying photos of himself on them.  His 
website contained explicit threats against U.S. and Israeli interests in Venezuela and 
posted pictures of masked men holding what appear to be explosive devices under a 
homemade Hezbollah banner.  
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This combination of rhetoric with action, however amateurish, may have 
prompted Chavez to crack down on Darnott to avoid negative publicity, especially given 
Darnott’s high-profile flaunting of his intentions and “terrorist” credentials.108  Public 
exposure of that nature would certainly serve as a propaganda victory for Chavez’ 
opponents, including the United States. They would undermine Chavez’ ability to deny 
support to terrorist groups, despite any ideological affinities he might share. The only 
surprise surrounding Chavez’ pragmatic need to distance himself publicly from such 
radicalism after the attempted attack in Caracas is that he allowed the group to get to that 
point in the first place. 
Though Hezbollah Venezuela itself does not represent a true threat to security and 
stability, it does represent the potential for ideological indoctrination of radical Islamic 
thought to subgroups of Latin American society. The ability of this group to spawn out of 
an indigenous community is indicative of the radical Islamic influence permeating La 
Guajira. As Hezbollah Venezuela’s website indicates, the group was supportive of many 
aspects of Chavez’ Bolivarian socialist project, notably it emphasis on social justice and 
giving voice to the poor and oppressed.  Many of the ideological underpinnings that 
found fertile minds among Wayuu converts to Hezbollah Venezuela are nearly identical 
to those espoused by Hugo Chavez. The primary difference between the two is merely 
the nationalistic aspirations of one, and the specific religious connotation of the other.  
Beyond these differences, both share a strong anti-American, anti-neoliberal, anti-
imperialist ideology of victimization. Hezbollah Venezuela demonstrates how the 
transition from one to the other is possible, and stands as a warning of the potential for 
similar indoctrination and conversion.  
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Implications for US and Regional Security 
Iranian Political Instability 
Recent events in Iran carry a potential impact on Hezbollah’s global outreach.  
Iran’s current international standoff with the West over its nuclear program presents an 
opportunity for the Iranian regime to strengthen its support for Hezbollah. As noted 
earlier, reporting indicates that before Hezbollah operative Imad Mughniyeh’s death, he 
was given the task of preparing Hezbollah-led reprisals outside of Iran in the event of any 
attack against Iranian nuclear facilities. Such a strike would mobilize popular support for 
the regime. It would also serve as a pretext for the regime to severely stifle the nascent 
opposition movement indefinitely. This possibility presents a beneficial outcome to 
Hezbollah and other groups receiving Iranian assistance.  Iranian support to these groups 
would increase in tandem with the damage wrought by any Western-led attack on Iran’s 
nuclear facilities.  
On the contrary, any significant political turmoil in Iran that threatens to 
destabilize the regime, such as ongoing opposition protests throughout the country, 
represents a significant threat to Hezbollah’s financial and logistical support base. The 
opposition movement, sparked by the disputed June 2009 presidential elections has yet to 
dissipate entirely. Opposition protesters have continued to use any public gathering or 
holiday as a pretext to voice disagreement with the government. It is much too early to 
tell what the outcome of the opposition movement will be. Should the movement gain 
traction and effect a change in the posture or structure of the government of Iran, these 
changes could include a moderation of the harsh anti-Western rhetoric that has long been 
a staple of the regime. This would certainly represent a strategic threat to Hezbollah. 
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These challenges to the Iranian regime should put Hezbollah on notice that its primary 
financial and ideological backer may not always be there. Hezbollah’s close cooperation 
with criminal enterprises and drug cartels in Latin America demonstrate an attempt to 
diversity its financial support base and increase its global outreach. 
The 1992 and 1994 bombings of Jewish targets in Argentina demonstrated the 
ability of Hezbollah to act far from its traditional theater of operations. Unknown is how 
far Hezbollah and Iran would go in retaliation for any strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. 
Western conflict with Iran allows Hezbollah to strengthen and consolidate its base of 
support and expand its operational scope. Thus Hezbollah is keen to see Iran drawn into 
conflict so as to retain this financial and ideological support structure. On the contrary, 
Iranian political instability represents a continual threat to Hezbollah’s security. 
Hezbollah has thus pragmatically sought global financial diversification, in a twist of 
capitalist irony likely lost on its anti-neoliberal leadership.  
 
Implications for Policymakers 
The US has been aware of the threat posed by Hezbollah since the 1983 suicide 
attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut killed 231 US military personnel. That attack was 
the single deadliest attack on Americans overseas since the Tet offensive in Vietnam, and 
as if to emphasize that point, former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage believes 
that "Hezbollah may be the 'A-Team of Terrorists' and maybe al Qaeda is actually the 'B' 
team.”109   Past associations between Hezbollah and al Qaeda demonstrate the ability of 
the two groups to put aside religious differences (Hezbollah is Shia, while al Qaeda is 
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Sunni) in order to focus on the common enemy, America.  The plea agreement of a 
former al Qaida member states that Osama bin Laden met personally with Imad 
Mughnieyh, the former head of Hezbollah external security who masterminded the 1983 
attack.110Testimony from other former al Qaeda members indicates that al Qaeda sent 
operatives to Lebanon in the mid-1990s, where they kept a safe house and were given 
instruction by Hezbollah members on how to blow up large buildings in the manner of 
the 1983 barracks bombing.111  
 Despite these past associations, close collaboration on a large scale between 
Hezbollah and al Qaeda is unlikely today given the high priority placed by the US on 
disrupting al Qaeda operations since September 11. A congressional report on Hezbollah 
issued for a joint House committee meeting in September 2006 took note of several 
important developments regarding Hezbollah and al Qaeda.112  This report presented the 
overall assessment of the Hezbollah threat to the US as “moderate.” It also concluded in 
that Hezbollah and al Qaeda did not appear to be making any attempts to establish ties 
with each other, if for no other reason than Sunni al Qaeda’s inherent disdain for Shiism. 
Moreover, Hezbollah’s highly public and top-down organizational structure makes it a 
much larger and more accessible target than al Qaeda, providing a strong incentive to 
avoid association with the near-universal revulsion of al Qaeda methodology since 
September 11.  
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Hugo Chavez’ affection for Hezbollah’s successful model of resistance may serve 
as wonderful rhetorical ammunition, but in the end Chavez’ past actions have shown a 
proclivity to pragmatic decision-making when it really counts. And few things are more 
vital to Venezuela and Chavez’ political survival than a steady flow of crude oil out of 
the country. Despite occasional threats to cut off oil to the US, even a populist like 
Chavez would find little support if he suddenly lost the massive oil revenues that make 
up the bulk of Venezuela’s economy.113 Venezuela exports roughly a million barrels per 
day to the US and is its fifth-largest supplier of oil.114 Likewise, the US is the primary 
consumer of Venezuelan crude, accounting for nearly 63% of Venezuelan exports.115 A 
loss of the US market would be catastrophic both for Venezuela’s economy and for 
Chavez’ Bolivarian socialist project, which depends almost entirely on continued oil 
revenues for its survival. In a large dose of irony, Chavez’ Achilles heel remains his 
dependence on the US oil market to financially support his anti-capitalist, anti-western 
socialist vision for Venezuela.  
 Many states around the world, including Venezuela, do not view Hezbollah as a 
terrorist organization. Those who fail to classify Hezbollah as a terrorist organization 
tend to view the differing wings of Hezbollah’s operations as entirely separate entities. 
That is, a clear distinction is made between the armed operations and the political and 
social aspects of Hezbollah activities. This convenient division of responsibility makes it 
easier for Hugo Chavez and others to praise Hezbollah as a successful model of 
resistance without explicitly advocating violence. This rationale, however, ignores a very 
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fundamental premise to Hezbollah’s organizational structure and should be re-evaluated 
by many of the states that currently do not list Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.  
As the organizational chart shows, Hezbollah is organized in a strong top-down 
division of responsibility, in many ways like a corporate structure. Thus, as strategic 
policy decisions are made at the top, or Shura Council, they are implemented by all parts 
of the organization, including the medical clinics, social workers, politicians, guerilla 
fighters, and the outwardly-focused External Security Organization. Hezbollah Deputy 
Secretary-General Sheik Naim Qassem illustrates: 
116 
“If the military wing were separated from the political wing, this would have 
repercussions, and it would reflect on the political scene. But Hezbollah has one 
single leadership, and its name is the Decision-Making Shura Council. It manages 
the political activity, the Jihad [i.e., the military] activity, the cultural and the 
social activities. Hezbollah’s Secretary General is the head of the Shura Council 
and also the head of the Jihad Council, and this means that we have one 
leadership, with one administration.”117  
 
For policymakers concerned with the global threat that Hezbollah poses, there 
could be no clearer indicator of how the organization views itself and its overall 
objectives. A great many governments in the world do indeed differentiate between 
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Hezbollah’s armed activities and its aboveboard political and social operations. It is a 
mistake for governments and policymakers to draw lines between these components 
when, as Sheik Qassem makes crystal clear, Hezbollah itself considers such distinctions 
illegitimate.  As was noted earlier, financial donations transferred to Hezbollah from 
anywhere in the world end up in a single general fund, portions of which are then divided 
among the disparate social, political, and armed wings. Funding generated through 
otherwise-legitimate means such as charities can easily end up in the coffers of the armed 
resistance and the “Jihad Council.”   
The question in attempting to fully understand the extent of support existing in 
Latin America for Hezbollah, then, is one of intent. It becomes difficult to distinguish 
between those who otherwise would not send money to support violence but do so 
because they are duped, and those who are ultimately responsible for the deceit. It is the 
latter who represent the core of support and who manage the infrastructure necessary for 
these complex overseas financing operations. The most troubling aspect of this support 
network is whether or not the capability exists to move from mere financing to armed 
operations.  By all reporting, the US has been aware of Hezbollah’s presence in Latin 
America for some time. The US Treasury Department has already taken direct action 
against Hezbollah interests in the region. It has conducted operations against small- and 
large-scale money laundering and drug smuggling organizations who funneled portions 
of their profits Hezbollah.118  
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Testimony given by Israeli Dr. Col. Eitan Azani at a 2006 Congressional hearing 
on Hezbollah confirmed that the organization’s general approach to international 
operations has consistently been oriented in precisely this manner: 
 
“[Hezbollah’s] approach stipulates a methodical formation of global operational 
capabilities that would provide flexibility in deciding to carry out an operation 
and shorten the organization’s response times. It is likely that the expansion of the 
organization’s infrastructure abroad suits Iranian interests, which sees Hezbollah 
as one of the components of its retaliation in case of a military or diplomatic crisis 
surrounding the Iranian nuclear program.” 119 
 
None of this precludes the possibility of a change in policy on the part of 
Venezuela, Hezbollah or its Iranian patron. Indeed, should the geopolitical situation 
prompt any of the parties to deem it in their interests for Hezbollah to move to an 
operational posture in Latin America, it appears evident the capacity for a quick 
escalation of these activities is in place. One scenario likely to prompt such a change 
would involve significant armed conflict in the Middle East involving Israel, Hezbollah, 
and/or Iran. Hezbollah’s activities in Latin America have been described as akin to a 
Western-Hemisphere “insurance policy,” hedging against any threat to its base of 
operations in Lebanon.120 The establishment of direct Venezuela – Iran flights, 
allegations of the issuance of false travel documents, and the myriad connections between 
members of Hezbollah, the Iranian establishment, and at the very least benign neglect on 
the part of Venezuelan government officials make clear that such a “rapid breakout” 
capacity is easily possible. 
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Conclusion 
By cultivating a closer relationship with Iran, Hugo Chavez may be letting the 
genie out of the bottle. The close ties between the two nations as seen of late could well 
turn out to be little more than a marriage of convenience. Though Iran does indeed share 
many of Chavez’ anti-western and anti-American views, its priorities for the region may 
not turn out to align with Chavez’ own strategic imperatives. Ironically, it is through his 
actions to strengthen ties to Iran and implicitly to groups like Hezbollah that Chavez 
actually increases the possibility for the conflict that he warns is being planned by the 
US. As a military officer, Chavez is certainly aware of his country’s inability to win a 
conventional war against the United States. Given that oil remains the mainstay of the 
Venezuelan economy and that the US is Venezuela’s primary consumer of oil, it is 
reasonable to conclude that despite his harsh rhetoric, Chavez does not seek conflict with 
the US. 
The significance of Teodoro Darnott’s Hezbollah Venezuela lies not in the fact 
that it failed in its initial attack, or that Chavez shut it down, but that it came to exist at 
all. The ability of Hezbollah to gain ideological traction within a tribal society of 
Venezuela speaks to the movement’s prospects for ideological indoctrination and 
recruitment within the region. Without a doubt, Teodoro Darnott was behind a rather 
pathetic attempt to copy Hezbollah’s success. However, the fact that he was even able to 
recruit followers and to mount an attack in Venezuela’s capital after publicly making 
radical statements on his websites prior to those attacks should worry not only Western 
policymakers, but Hugo Chavez himself. 
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The fact that Chavez’ government allowed Hezbollah Venezuela to operate at all 
speaks to the affinity with which Chavez views Hezbollah’s successes in Lebanon.  
Despite the explicit public threats made by Hezbollah Venezuela against Western 
interests in the country, it was not until an actual attempted attack that Chavez’ 
government was prompted to take action. This represents the core paradox facing Chavez 
as he attempts to build his anti-American “multi-polar” coalition: How will it be possible 
to continue to align himself with players like Iran and Hezbollah if the actions of those 
groups come to directly threaten his own security?  
The answer seems that in his haste to oppose the US, Chavez may indeed have 
overplayed his hand. Iran and Hezbollah have shown a willingness to use terrorism 
overseas in the past, and they are taking advantage of warming ties with Venezuela to 
establish a western support network. Should Iran, Hezbollah, or an inspired local offshoot 
like Hezbollah Venezuela decide to take violent action in the future utilizing the 
preexisting support network in Venezuela, Chavez would stand to lose as much as the 
intended target of the attack, if not more. It would directly threaten Chavez’ security, as 
pressure to crack down would be immense. The two possible response options Chavez 
would have in this scenario would both undermine his entire anti-American project.  
The first would require a major policy shift on his part to distance Venezuela from 
all associations with Iran and Hezbollah.  If such an attack were to be even moderately 
successful, Chavez would be forced to denounce it lest he be seen as a supporter of 
terrorism -- a political prospect that not even Chavez would be likely to survive. This 
outcome would be of tangible strategic benefit to the US as well as a blow to Chavez’ 
credibility. The second option would be to maintain the status quo. This presents no good 
   
 62 
alternatives for Chavez in that he would be tacitly endorsing terrorism and counting 
himself among international pariahs even more so than he already is today. He would 
thus be faced with near-certain political defeat, or in a worst-case scenario, armed 
opposition and conflict. Each of these scenarios represents a losing proposition for 
Chavez’ regime and his Bolivarian socialist project. They illustrate the long-term dangers 
of his foreign policy agenda should he continue on the path he has chosen.  
Iran’s close ties to Hezbollah and its deepening embrace of Chavez’ regime 
should put the United States on alert to the security of both friendly Latin American 
governments and its own southern border.  The potential for groups like Hezbollah to 
utilize Venezuela as an entry point to the Americas, to obtain official Venezuelan 
documentation, and to utilize well-known smuggling networks in cooperation with 
established violent drug cartels heightens this danger.   
Hugo Chavez identifies with what he considers to be Hezbollah’s successful 
model of resistance to imperialism, and it appears he seeks to emulate elements of that 
success within his sphere of influence.  His demonstrated support for anti-American 
groups like FARC and his labeling of US-backed Colombia the “Israel of Latin 
America,”  should be seen as an indication of his willingness to embrace other radical 
elements sharing a common anti-American agenda.  By allowing Iranian and Hezbollah 
operatives ease of access to the Americas through Venezuela, Chavez runs a substantial 
risk to the stability of his regime.  Should Hezbollah or Iran seek to exploit their ability to 
function in Venezuela by pursing specific operational goals, the probability of future 
confrontation with the U.S. will most certainly increase, inviting the only scenario in 
which Chavez is nearly guaranteed to lose.  
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